This book is a rediscovery and examination of the thinking of Vasile Băncilă, a philosopher forbidden by the totalitarian regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu. The philosopher Lucian Blaga saw Băncilă as a threat to the spirit of the highest Romanian culture. It is estimated that Băncilă's work extends to 32 volumes, 17 of which have been published so far. With such a significant opus, Vasile Băncilă is, indisputably, a key figure in contemporary Romanian culture, particularly in the sphere of philosophy. (...) The book has eleven chapters and is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the hermeneutics of the author's youthful works. His reflections on the purpose of philosophy for life are important, about the role of this discipline in the education of adolescents and students, the relationship between irony and education, his thoughts of one of the greatest Romanian poets, Mihai Eminescu, and the philosophy of Descartes and of Schopenhauer. In the second part, the book looks at Băncilă's aim of structuring a possible system of philosophy; more precisely, an ethnic-spiritualist metaphysics which, when it was elaborated, contradicted the official ideology of the totalitarian regime. Finally, the book covers the philosopher's work, analysing step-by-step the relation between the part and the whole (pars pro toto), as well as between existence and metaphysics, and the philosopher's conclusions about Romanian existence. (shrink)

This volum includes 37 papers of mathematics or applied mathematics written by the author alone or in collaboration with the following co-authors: Cătălin Barbu, Mihály Bencze, Octavian Cira, Marian Niţu, Ion Pătraşcu, Mircea E. Şelariu, Rajan Alex, Xingsen Li, Tudor Păroiu, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Yingjie Tian, Mohd Anasri, Lucian Căpitanu, Valeri Kroumov, Kimihiro Okuyama, Gabriela Tonţ, A. A. Adewara, Manoj K. Chaudhary, Mukesh Kumar, Sachin Malik, Alka Mittal, Neetish Sharma, Rakesh K. Shukla, Ashish K. Singh, Jayant (...) Singh, Rajesh Singh, V.V. Singh, Hansraj Yadav, Amit Bhaghel, Dipti Chauhan, V. Christianto, Priti Singh, and Dmitri Rabounski. (shrink)

All these extracts are linked by his general epistemology, especially his distinction between two types of knowledge: ‘paradisiac’ or Type 1, which is that of everyday awareness and the current methods, concepts and presuppositions of the sciences of nature and humanity, plus mathematics and philosophy, and accumulates in ‘plus knowledge’ and resolves problems in standard ways; and ‘Luciferican’ or Type 2, which opens up the ‘mysteries’ of new realms of reality which do not fit the current methods, concepts and presuppositions, (...) and so results in ‘minus’ knowledge, the awareness that there are things which at the moment we cannot understand. For these ‘mysteries’ new methods, concepts and presuppositions are required, which ‘abyssal’ categories can supply, ones below those we normally employ and may be aware of. It is part of man’s role in the cosmos to reveal such mysteries.. (shrink)

In Aesthetic Legacies, Lucian Krukowski traces the influence of three nineteenth-century theories of art through twentieth-century modernism and into the postmodernist present. Following the theories of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, Krukowski first discusses how each philosopher locates the aesthetic within the framework of the philosophical system. He then identifies each theory through a dominant theme and traces the transformations of these themes into later thought and practice. The Kantian legacy originates in the theme of beauty and continues through an (...) examination of aesthetic taste into the modernist concern with artistic form. Schopenhauer's legacy moves from the dynamics of will into the themes of creative expression and artistic intentionality. Hegel's identification of art as a symbol of spirit's evolution is traced through the themes of artistic progress and cultural criticism. Krukowski interprets late modernism as a period in which the continuing transformation of aesthetic themes is arrested and congeals into dogma. This precipitates the reaction we now call postmodernism. The author first examines postmodernism through its various rejections of modernist dogma and, in the book's concluding section, evokes the alternative ideologies and practices that characterize present-day art. (shrink)

The Hermotimus is Lucian’s longest piece of writing, surpassing even the two books of the True Tales, and at the same time his most successful effort to recreate the style and atmosphere of a Platonic dialogue, filled with a new—and for Lucian uncharacteristically serious—content, namely a sustained attack on “dogmatic” philosophical schools (the “haireseis” of its subtitle) and, inversely, a ringing endorsement of the tenets of Pyrrhonian Scepticism.... (review at BMCR).

Self-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions (Liar-type or Grelling-type), or in the form of the so called limitative theorems in mathematical logic (e.g. Gödel’s theorem). By deriving Gödel’s significant results from paradoxical constructions the limitative character of such self-referential constructions is preserved, but (...) they open the ways for a new representation of a great variety of arguments in the field of logic, mathematics and philosophy. (shrink)

Hegel und Heidegger teilen die Ansicht, dass das, was den Bedeutungsgehalt von Begriffen konstituiert, in ihrer unmittelbaren Verständlichkeit verborgen liegt. Dieser Gedanke bildet den Kern einer Konzeption der Negativität im Sinne einer Auffassung der Art und Weise, in der Sinn von Latenz geprägt ist. Hegel und Heidegger verstehen aber die Natur jener Latenz und das Verhältnis von Sinn und Begriff verschieden. Denn mit einer solchen Konzeption der Negativität ist die Frage verbunden, ob die Konstitution von Sinn begrifflich artikulierbar ist und (...) ob Sinn überhaupt begrifflich verfasst ist. Dieser Frage geht das Buch nach, indem es Hegel und Heidegger in ein Gespräch bringt, um den Stellenwert des begrifflichen Vermögens in der Konstitution und Artikulation von Sinn zu klären. Dabei wird eine Kritik an der Auffassung formuliert, dass die Quelle von Sinn nichtbegrifflich und unbegreiflich ist, und argumentiert, dass nur die begriffliche Artikulation von Bedeutungen die semantische Fülle der Welt verbürgt. (shrink)

As Roger Ariew shows, one of the most fascinating challenges for the authors trying to create a Cartesian complete course on philosophy was coming up with a Cartesian Logic based on the existing texts of the master. Were the few simple rules from the Discourse on Method the "logic" of Descartes? Were the Rules for the Direction of the Mind "logic"? How can we even have a logic without syllogism? When looking at the authors studied by Ariew one finds that (...) the best that they could come up was adding some Cartesian elements on what remains basically a traditional Aristotelian Logic. It seems that there was no Cartesian Logic after all.I want to show here that Cartesian Logic is something else, not exactly... (shrink)

Ion Soteropoulos reconciles the contradiction between the finite and infinite and transforms this reconciliation into the founding principle of motion. This book will appeal to readers interested in the logical mechanics of the physical universe, the hidden powers of our finite brain, and the utility of robots in the future.

Violence is signaled by a mark of discontinuity, interruption, rupture. The tripartite temporality of violence, with its strong focus on the present, points to the originary violence. Moreover, the violent event is structuring the order of the action sequences in an actual violent (embodied) interaction. The interactional dynamics in violent encounters between co-present actors shapes the specific forms of the experiencing in (and of) the violent interaction. Based on how violence is experienced in an interactive situation, the phenomenon of violence (...) articulates itself according to three coordinates: directedness, co-performativity and de-capabilisation. The outlining of the structure of the lived experience of violence is revealing something irreducible in it. To understand the experience of violence as such, I propose that we accept the idea of violence per se and depart from the idea that the acts of violence are essentially moral actions. The core of the ethical-moral discussion concerning violence should be grounded instead on the moment of conversion identifiable when we take into account the reaction to violence. (shrink)

This essay deals with metaphilosophical issues, i.e., different ways of “doing philosophy” and their possible applications for the formulation of a properly Brazilian philosophy. The arguments are drawn from questions that constitute the instigating and pertinent book by Gonçalo Palácios entitled De como fazer filosofia sem ser grego, estar morto ou ser gênio. In order to problematize the increasingly explored question of whether there is a Brazilian philosophy, firstly, I interact with some problems raised in the mentioned work, such as (...) academic philosophical practice, its attachment to the exegesis of works consecrated by tradition, and the consequent subdivision between history of philosophy and “philosophizing” through specific problems of national reality. Next, I articulate some elements that allow us to characterize a specifically Brazilian philosophy. To carry out this characterization, it is essential to critically articulate the relationship between philosophy teaching, in both school and academic level, with the philosophical tradition and its adjacent concepts. (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

The end of the East-West confrontation has by no means put an end to the possibility of war in Central Europe. The outbreak of ethno-religious hostilities in former Yugoslavia made it clear that the previous formation of the Eastern and Western blocks contained a Pandora’s box of ethno-religious conflicts which opened up after the end of the Cold War.

Developments in both China and Russia are a challenge to political science, and more particularly to theories of political culture. Both countries are engaged in profound processes of transition involving the abandonment of totalitarianism and the adoption of market-based economies. It is, however, far from clear what form their political systems will eventually take. They are currently following strikingly different paths. Are the differences a reflection of their distinctive cultures? Or, are the differences more structural, a manifestation of their respective (...) stages of economic and social development? Or, are they merely the consequences of the idiosyncratic choices and policy decisions of the two leaderships? (shrink)

In “On the Abolition of All Political Parties,” Simone Weil poses the hypothetical predicament of a person who is intent on solving highly complex mathematical problems but is flogged every time the answer he arrives at is an even number. The person will oscillate between his genuine desire for the truth and the painful cries of his body. “[I]nevitably,” Weil writes, “he will make many mistakes—even if he happens to be very intelligent, very brave and deeply attached to the truth.” (...) She then asks: “What should he do?” Weil’s answer may surprise many readers, even though she claims it is “simple.” If possible, “he must run away” from those who wield the whip. It would have been best, she avers, had he avoided these associations in the first place. Elsewhere in her writings, Weil openly endorses the argument for the lesser evil, justifying active, potentially violent, resistance instead of a pacifist ethic of refusal. This essay analyses the tension between Weil’s ethic of “running away” and her acceptance of the lesser evil. (shrink)

This article briefly compares and contrasts Kantian and Marxist thinking, trying to show how the second derived from the first.

In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel treats human sensibility differently in the sections on anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. With the recent revival of Hegel’s work, there has been a lively debate about how to understand the progression from more primitive to more sophisticated human capacities. This paper differentiates three influential readings to that effect – the animals-first, the emancipatory, and the rational-first reading – and argues that they risk misconstruing mental development as a transition from one category of capacities to (...) the other. The transition is rendered in terms of either accumulation, emancipation, or maturation. But this basic picture confuses the capacities characterizing us as a kind of animal, a kind of consciousness, and a conceptually self-conscious being. This paper explains how anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology articulate complementary, but irreducible categories of human capacities. The apparently more basic capacities are abstractable aspects of those that come later in the order of presentation. The distinct kinds of capacities do not stand separately on a three-step ladder of mental development but are aspects of one singular and synchronous development of the human mind. Their particular development is mutually dependent on each other but can be properly accounted for only in distinctive categorial terms. (shrink)

Neste artigo, trato de algumas das especificidades da neurofilosofia de Catherine Malabou. Parto da sua caracterização do conceito de plasticidade como crítica ao modo como as posições de orientação naturalista tendem a definir o “neuronal” como um termo objetivo. Em seguida, considero que, apesar de sua crítica à posição antirreducionista fenomenológica, o seu próprio modelo de materialismo é pós-fenomenológico por assimilar alguns aspectos da fenomenologia clássica, mas acrescentando novos elementos conceituais que a distanciam dos materialismos que compõem a filosofia analítica (...) da mente. Ao assimilar alguns pressupostos materialistas, como a análise do cérebro e das sinapses neuronais; e fenomenológicos, no que se refere à constituição experiencial da fisiologia do cérebro, Malabou utiliza a noção de personalidade orgânica ou de proto-self. O significado desses termos implica mais do que a referência conceitual às ciências cognitivas, pois que é preciso compreender a neurofilosofia de Malabou também sob à luz da historicidade do cérebro, em um sentido não-teleológico. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world (...) taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

Concerns regarding the possibility of a phenomenological science of consciousness emerged almost from its inception. Naturalism was quick to attack phenomenology. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others have too argued that a phenomenological science of consciousness can succeed if repositioning classical phenomenology from an existentialist perspective. One way to close this debate is to revisit several key classical phenomenological concepts. In this paper I depart from the premise that it is possible to have a phenomenological science of consciousness (...) but in order to do that we must distinguish between the problem of objectivity and the problem of consciousness keeping in mind that the two are intimately related. I will be discussing some of the differences between universally valid and experimental statements and make some remarks with respect to the phenomenological origins of consciousness without getting in too many details. The present purpose is to tackle some of these epistemological and ontological aspects pertaining to science and consciousness without making strong claims. (shrink)

ArgumentThis text is a reflection on the fate of a special kind of scientific object - anatomy collections - and their place in contemporary times. Though the phenomenon of keeping and displaying such collections is generally dying out, those specimens which survive continue to puzzle and fascinate us. To understand the current status of such collections, and the nostalgia evoked by the specimens within them, I argue, we should approach them as modern ruins. This allows us to think of them (...) as places of absence, pointing to unfinished lives and unfinished scientific projects. The paper begins with the story of a preserved human face from the Francis I. Rainer anatomical-anthropological collection (Bucharest), and continues by discussing the fate of that collection, and of anatomy collections more widely. Ultimately, the paper asks, what is it that we want to preserve: specimens, practices, or research philosophies? (shrink)